Hussman tells it like it is:

Understand that the money that the government is throwing around represents a transfer of wealth from an unwitting public to the bondholders of mismanaged financial corporations, even while foreclosures continue. Even if the Fed buys up the Treasuries being issued, and thereby “monetizes” the debt, that increase in government liabilities will mean a long-term erosion in the purchasing power of people on relatively fixed incomes.

How did the banks get so powerful?

In a word, no.  But Michael White uses Bill Gross’ own words from his newsletters in a lengthy articulation of a wonderful story about how Bill Gross could “see the light” and do the right thing … by accepting equity for a big piece of PIMCO’s debt and leading the other bond holders to do the same.  Swamp Report thinks the bottom line is that equity for debt is inevitable, whether Bill Gross likes it or not.  (ml-implode.com)

The President should explain exactly why bank creditors are being bailed out under the systemic risk exception of the “least cost” way to take over a bank .  Why are bondholders more important to him than Taxpayers? Zero Hedge (hat tip), writing a great piece about the FDIC chastising Bloomberg for “inaccurate reporting” regarding FDIC’s dwindling resources, highlights what a legal dictionary says about the systemic risk exception in taking over a bank:

§ 360.1 Least-cost resolution.

(a) General rule. Except as provided in section 13(c)(4)(G) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1823 (c)(4)(G)), the FDIC shall not take any action, directly or indirectly, under sections 13(c), 13(d), 13(f), 13(h) or 13(k) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1823 (c), (d), (f), (h) or (k)) with respect to any insured depository institution that would have the effect of increasing losses to any insurance fund by protecting:

(1) Depositors for more than the insured portion of their deposits (determined without regard to whether such institution is liquidated); or

(2) Creditors other than depositors.

(b) Purchase and assumption transactions. Subject to the requirement of section 13(c)(4)(A) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(A)), paragraph (a) of this section shall not be construed as prohibiting the FDIC from allowing any person who acquires any assets or assumes any liabilities of any insured depository institution, for which the FDIC has been appointed conservator or receiver, to acquire uninsured deposit liabilities of such institution as long as the applicable insurance fund does not incur any loss with respect to such uninsured deposit liabilities in an amount greater than the loss which would have been incurred with respect to such liabilities if the institution had been liquidated.

[58 FR 67664, Dec. 22, 1993, as amended at 63 FR 37761, July 14, 1998]

To get a grip on the too big to fail problem, Congress established a difficult-to-trigger systemic risk exception. A least-cost resolution can be foregone – and by implication a resolution method selected that results in uninsured depositors and other creditors being protected – only if the Board Of Directors of the FDIC, The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the president, determine the least-costly approach “would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability.”